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Francis: Building China’s Intellectual Property Regime

Introduction
The political and economic reform that began in 1978 paved the way that led to the
establishment of an Intellectual Property (IP) regime in China, helping legitimize China’s
presence in the international market and satisfying foreign pressure that often demanded that
China conform to international IP standards. China’s engagement within the Western construct
of IP1 rights is specifically aligned with China’s international trade interests. It was the desire to
become a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and fully integrate into the world
economy that contributed to the Chinese regime’s adoption of IP rights that aligned with the
World Trade Organization Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement
(TRIPS)2.
The practicality of enforcing IP rights in China has not only been challenging and
frustrating for IP rights holders, but has also been incompatible with local domestic interests. The
causes of IP infringement in China do not stem from one single source—as many would
assume—but instead must be attributed to a number of critical factors that come into play from
different angles. The induction of an IP regime in China illustrates the imposition that
globalization exerts on developing countries in adopting and enforcing policies that originate
from dominant exogenous pressure. It also illustrates China’s goal to become modernized and
integrated into the global economy. Although China’s entry into the WTO has substantially
harmonized its IP laws with international standards, China’s IP regime remains weak given the
lack of rigid administrative enforcement. A comprehensive look at China’s IP system since 1978
and its development over the past thirty-five years helps to explain why IP remains a
contemporary issue in China today.
Background
Two epochs in Chinese history carry fundamentally different viewpoints of Intellectual
Property Rights (IPR). The Maoist era3, which lasted from 1949-1976, imposed the socialist
ideals and the Confucian tradition of morality that placed an “emphasis on the collective”. This
translated into the state’s ownership of IP rights, which belonged to the community, not the
individual4. This belief can be traced back to Confucianism in ancient China, which was widely
accepted as the orthodoxy of the time5.
After Mao Zedong’s death in 1976, China began a process of transformation and
evolvement. This was known as the “Open Door Policy” because China began a process of

1

This is based on Western traditions of viewing IP rights as an exclusive individual right to own something as
opposed to having something collectively owned. Stoianoff, Naalie. "The Influence of the WTO over China's IP
Regime ." Sydney Law Review. no. 1 (2012): 67-68 http://www.law.usyd.edu.au/slr/ (accessed September 18,
2013).
2
The Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is an international agreement created by the
WTO that sets down the minimum standards for many forms of IP regulation (WTO Overview of TRIPS).
3
The Maoist era was led by Mao Zedong, the founding father of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), in 1948. Mao
achieved complete leadership both within the party and the state which gave him tremendous constitutional
power. Mao ruled the PRC until his death in 1976. Source: “Mao Zedong”, David Delia, p 52
4
Stoianoff, Naalie. "The Influence of the WTO over China's IP Regime ." Sydney Law Review. no. 1 (2012): 67-68
http://www.law.usyd.edu.au/slr/ (accessed September 18, 2013).
5

Liwei Wang, "The Chinese traditions inimical to the Patent Law," Northwestern Journal of International Law &
Business;, 14, no. 1 (1993): 23
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integration into the global community6. If China were to become a more globally integrated
nation, it had to open itself to the rest of the world. This meant opening its economy to global
market and becoming a more competitive nation. The Open Door Policy era completely reshaped
how IPR were to be constructed by the state. During the Open Door Policy, China sought to
fund the development of science and technology. In order to accomplish this, the state sought
help from developed, western countries that were more technologically advanced. Western
countries have long possessed an integrated system of IPR within technological advancement
that has historically granted patents and other type of IP rights for inventions7. Therefore,
embracing an all encompassing (western orientated) IP regime was a part of Deng Xiaoping’s
four modernizations movement which sought to engage China with the rest of the world.8
The transition from a collective to an individualist construct of IP rights, however, has
been a continuous challenge for the Chinese state given that many of the laws and international
agreements have been difficult to administer and enforce. After the induction of the Open Door
Policy, many Chinese people were still deeply entrenched within the ideas and practices of their
previous leadership, such as the collectivist doctrine of IP It would not belong until the Chinese
state received tremendous exogenous pressure to better align its IP laws with international law.
From the late 1970s up until the mid 1990s, the measures introduced to combat issues
such as copyright and piracy were seen as weak by countries like the US. Although the state had
already created patent, copyright, and trademark law, they were not aligned with the TRIPS
Agreement. The laws were seen as deficient and China was blocked from entering the WTO until
it began to revise its laws. It was not until 1997 when more effective measures were executed
and after the US listed China in the Special 301 report. From 1999-2001, China agreed to the
TRIPS Agreement and “harmonized” its patent, copyright, and trademark laws with the TRIPS
Agreement and at the end of 2001, China was allowed to join the WTO9.
Intellectual Property
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) defines IP as “creations of the
mind” (WIPO). Intellectual Property can be anything (product, service etc.) tangible or
intangible that has been created by an inventor for a specified purpose, whether it is for
entertainment, academic and non-academic, industrial, scientific, business purposes etc.
Intellectual Property is subdivided into three main areas: copyrights, patents, and trademarks. In
China, a patent secures an idea or an invention that “can be obtained for a new product or
process or for an improvement to a new product or process”10. Whenever someone creates an
invention or an idea, they may secure this asset from being used by others. A patent functions to
secure its inventor’s right to his/her product or technology from being used by others and
6

Stoianoff, Naalie. "The Influence of the WTO over China's IP Regime ." Sydney Law Review. no. 1 (2012): 69
http://www.law.usyd.edu.au/slr/ (accessed September 18, 2013).
7
Naigen, Zhang. "Intellectual Property Law in China: Basic Policy and New Developments."Annual Survey of
International and Comparative Law. no. 1 (1997): 3.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1028&context=annlsurvey (accessed October 28,
2013).
8

The four modernizations focused on transforming four sectors of China’s society: industry, agriculture, national
defense and science and technology (Stioanoff 2012: 69)
9
Stoianoff, Naalie. "The Influence of the WTO over China's IP Regime ." Sydney Law Review. no. 1 (2012): 78
http://www.law.usyd.edu.au/slr/ (accessed September 18, 2013).
10
Ordish, Rebecca and Alan Adcock. 2008. China Intellectual Property - Challenges & Solutions : An Essential
Business Guide. Singapore: John Wiley & Sons (Asia): 103,106

https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/jogc/vol2/iss1/3

2

Francis: Building China’s Intellectual Property Regime

provides the patentee with the right to be the exclusive user, producer, seller, or importer of
his/her product11. A patent is similar to a piece of physical/tangible property given in that it can
be “bought, sold, mortgaged, licensed or charged”12. In China, the rights to own a patent often
come with territorial privilege—the right to own that patent within the area in which it was
licensed. A patent that has been registered in China, for example, will only provide its owner
with rights within China and nowhere else, with the exception that the patent is registered
elsewhere.
Copyright refers to the “expression of an idea”. It functions to protect the integrity of a
“literary or artistic work” from any form of modifications that may alter its characteristics.
Copyright intends to keep the work in its original form even if it is has been bought and sold to a
new owner. For example, the author of a published book has the exclusive rights to make copies,
license and exploit a literary, musical, or artistic work. Copyrights can be extended to anything
that has an audio, video or printed quality. In other words, it protects tangible objects.13
Trademark is the subcategory of IP constructed to safeguard logos, designs, marks,
names or any physically commercial asset owned by individuals. Trademark protects the asset
that “is a symbol or other identifier that conveys information about the product”14. The owner
has the exclusive right to own and receive compensation for his/her trademark. Trademarks
practically market a company’s name or brand. If a company’s trademark has a popular
reputation, it is obvious that that company would prefer to hold the exclusive rights to that design
and prevent any commercial duplication.
Prior to the TRIPs Agreement, there existed no defined regulation under international
law. IP law was domestically regulated and incorporated, “a patchwork of international treaties
and conventions”15. Since the TRIPS Agreement came into effect on January 1, 1995, its
intention was to be comprehensive by continuing to enforce specific standards from previous
international conventions and treaties such as the World Intellectual Property Organization, the
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, and the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. The TRIPS Agreement not only incorporates policy
from these agreements but it also adds new enforcement provisions that were necessary for
maintaining IP protection16.

11

Mertha, Andrew. "Policy Enforcement Markets: How Bureaucratic Redundancy Contributes to Effective
Intellectual Property Implementation in China."Comparative Politics. no. 3 (2006): p. 17.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20433999 . (accessed October 28, 2013).

12

Ordish, Rebecca and Alan Adcock. 2008. China Intellectual Property - Challenges & Solutions : An Essential
Business Guide. Singapore: John Wiley & Sons (Asia): 106
13
Mertha, Andrew. "Policy Enforcement Markets: How Bureaucratic Redundancy Contributes to Effective
Intellectual Property Implementation in China."Comparative Politics. no. 3 (2006): p. 18.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20433999 . (accessed October 28, 2013).
14
Ibid
15
White, Marlaine. "Intellectual Property Regulation under International Law." The International Studies
Encyclopedia. Denemark, Robert A. Blackwell Publishing, 2010. Blackwell Reference Online. 14 September 2013
http://www.isacompendium.com/subscriber/tocnode.html?id=g9781444336597_yr2011_chunk_g9781444336597
11_ss1-11
16

World Trade Organization , "Overview: the TRIPS Agreement." Accessed September 18, 2013.
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm.
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The TRIPS agreement covers several main issues: applying general principles of
International Trade and other IP arrangements; providing sufficient protection of IP rights which
include Copyright, Trademark, Geographical indicators, Patents, and Trade secrets; defining the
ways by which countries should enforce IP within borders; and ways of settling disputes on IP
between members of WTO. The purpose of this agreement is to protect IP across international
borders and unify the way in which IP laws are to be written and enforced within countries.17
Several scholars have written extensively about IP within different theoretical contexts which
may be linked to China’s history and experience.
Literature Review
Gary Schaub writes about deterrence and compellence, two international relations
theories that can be used to understand how international pressure led China to construct an IP
regime. Deterrence and compellence are two theories of coercion. According to Schaub, what
both theories have in common is their dependence on threats used to lead the adversary to
acquiesce to the coercer’s demands. However, what distinguishes them is the nature of the
demands. Schaub distinguished the two by stating that:
Deterrence links a demand that the adversary refrain from undertaking a
particular action to threat to use force if it does not comply, where as
compellence couples a demand that the adversary undertake a particular action
to threat to use of force if it does not comply18
Andrew Mertha makes the argument that in the case of the Chinese IP regime,
compellence is the preferred type of coercion used by countries, particularly the US, in
pressuring the state to establish an intellectual property regime that is compatible with
international intellectual property law19. Sanctions in this case are not militarily motivated, but
instead economic. China’s accession into the WTO was contingent on synchronizing its domestic
IP laws with international standards20. Accession into the WTO would deepen China’s
integration into the global market and international trade.
Transplant theory refers to the introduction of a set of laws, institutions, regulations,
principles, and ideas from one country, location, or distinct place to another. Deming Liu looks
at the transplant effect of Chinese Patent Law. Liu argues that there are several factors that can
prevent a transplanted law from working. These include “suitable machinery for
implementation” that lacks effective enforcement, lack of noncompliance among the general
public, and set of transplanted laws that are incompatible with the cultural norms of that country
(Liu 738).

17

World Trade Organization , "Intellectual property: protection and enforcement." Accessed September 18, 2013.
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm.
18

Gary Schaub Jr., "Deterrence, Compellence, and Prospect Theory," International Society of Political Psychology ,
25, no. 3 (2004): 389-411
19

Mertha, Andrew. "Policy Enforcement Markets: How Bureaucratic Redundancy Contributes to Effective
Intellectual Property Implementation in China."Comparative Politics. no. 3 (2006): p. 6
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20433999 . (accessed October 28, 2013).
20
Shoukang, Guo; Xaiodong, Zuo, Are Chinese Intellectual property laws consistent with the Trips Agreement?,
Editor. Torremans, Paul; Shawn, Hailing; Erauw, Johan (UK: Edward Elgar): p 16.
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A transplanted law should also be compatible with the legal culture of the transplant
country. Legal culture is defined as “those parts of the general culture—customs, opinions, ways
of doing and thinking—that bend social forces towards or away from the law in particular ways”.
The notion of legal culture is divided into what is known as “lay legal culture” which refers to
the attitude of the general public towards the law and “internal legal culture” which refers to the
attitude of legal professionals towards the law21. As a transplanted society, China possess some
of the disparities that would illustrate the degree to which the transplanted laws produced friction
with domestic enforcement and the general attitude of the Chinese public towards IPR.
Rami Olwan’s analysis of international IP rights and developing countries relates to this
line of analysis. He details a comprehensive framework for grasping the idea of the role and
impact of IP on development. According to Olwan, although establishing a successful IP regime
is necessary for the future of developing countries, its implementation has failed due to the “one
size fits all” approach22.
There are two important issues to take into account whenever evaluating the success of an
IP system within developing counties. Firstly, IP laws that do not fulfill the needs of developing
countries and do not contribute to society, will most likely be limited. IP laws must be aligned
with developed countries’ national development strategies and policies. The crafting of IP laws
that foster the aspect of “cultural diversity” is also critical to the chain of analysis. Olwan
believes that, “A cultural approach to [IP] recognizes existing disparities in cultural capabilities
resulting from economic, social and cultural inequalities and seeks IP laws that accommodate
difference”23. China, as a developing country, crafted its own IP laws to harmonize with its
socialist development policies. However, foreign pressure changed the course of its domestic
laws to align with international standards. This strengthened, instead of weakened, China’s IP
regime by making its domestic law more compatible with international law. The notion of
cultural diversity within Chinese IP development is incompatible with the global market and
international trade, given China’s traditional emphasis on the collective ownership of IP. China
thus clearly illustrates a case in which international IP laws have been imposed on a developing
nation.
The Adoption of IP Laws
China constructed an IP regime to harmonize with its national development policies and
its desire to become a globalized nation. The four modernizations were indicative of China’s
economic reform from the Maoist era into one, which was conducive to economic prosperity and
China’s full integration into the global economy. In order to attract foreign investment and
foreign technology the state created IP laws24.

21

Liu Deming , "The Transplant Effect of Chinese Patent Law," Chinese Journal of International Law, 05, no. 3
(2006): 738
22

Olwan, Rami M. Intellectual Property and Development : Theory and Practice. Dordrecht: Springer, 2012.
http://fairfield.eblib.com.libdb.fairfield.edu/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=1082434 (accessed September 25, 2013):
16
23

Olwan, Rami M. Intellectual Property and Development : Theory and Practice. Dordrecht: Springer, 2012.
http://fairfield.eblib.com.libdb.fairfield.edu/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=1082434 (accessed September 25, 2013):
10
24
Stoianoff, Natalie. "The Influence of the WTO over China's IP Regime ." Sydney Law Review. no. 1 (2012): 69
http://www.law.usyd.edu.au/slr/ (accessed September 18, 2013).
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The 1982 constitution was a product of China’s political reform and erased many of the
policies adopted during the Maoist era25. During the Maoist era, the Regulations on Awards for
Inventions came into effect by the communist party in 1963 and stipulated that “all inventions
are property of the state”26. Since IP law was non-existent during this period, it was the
responsibility of the state to build a system in which it could be developed and sustained.
The table below illustrates many of the steps taken by the communist party to craft new
IP laws. These laws were different in that they were more aligned with the western tradition of IP
while still preserving the socialist ideal of the state such as the 1984 patent law and the 1990
copyright law. It also illustrates foreign pressure coming from the US towards China as a result
of dissatisfaction with China’s IP regime.
1978
1979
1980
1982
1984
1985
1990
1991

Political and Economic Reform started; Regulations on awards for inventions
Sino-US bilateral trade agreement
China joins World IP Organization
Constitution of PRC – Fostered IP laws; Trademark law adopted
Implementing regulations for trademark law; Patent law adopted
Implementing regulations for Patent law adopted
Copyright law adopted
Implementing regulations for copyright law adopted; The US added China to list of countries
allowing piracy; US opened special 301 report investigation of IPR in China

Table 1, The development of Chinese IP, 1978-1991(Ksherti: 156 and Staionaff: 70-2)

China created a grounded regime for IP law with the Constitution of 1982, which crafted
a completely new legal system that was suitable for the Open Door Policy era and, in which, IPR
may be incorporated and set in stone. This meant that judicial, legislative, and administrative
institutions were geared towards achieving the creation and enforcement of IP Law27.
In the years following the constitution, the state focused on the three subcategories of IP
law. Trademark law was the first IP law to be adopted by the state in 1982, patent law in 1985,
and copyright in 1990. The purpose of the 1984 Patent Law was:
To protect patent rights for inventions-creations, to encourage creationinvention, to foster the spreading and application of invention-creation and to
promote the development and innovation of science and technology for
meeting the needs of the construction of socialist modernization28
Similarly, the copyright law of 1990 stipulated that the purpose of the law is intended for:
Creation and dissemination of works, which would contribute to the
construction of the socialist spiritual and material civilization and of

25

Long, Weiqiu. "Intellectual Property in China." St. Mary Law Journal. (1999): 63-98.
http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE|A58938049&v=2.1&u=a04fu&it=r&p=LT&sw=w (accessed September
18, 2013).
26

Stoianoff, Natalie. "The Influence of the WTO over China's IP Regime ." Sydney Law Review. no. 1 (2012): 69
http://www.law.usyd.edu.au/slr/ (accessed September 18, 2013).
27
Long, Weiqiu. "Intellectual Property in China." St. Mary Law Journal. (1999): pp 3.
http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE|A58938049&v=2.1&u=a04fu&it=r&p=LT&sw=w (accessed September
18, 2013).
28
Stoianoff, Naalie. "The Influence of the WTO over China's IP Regime ." Sydney Law Review. no. 1 (2012): 70
http://www.law.usyd.edu.au/slr/ (accessed September 18, 2013).
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promoting the development and prosperity of the socialist culture and
science.29
What makes these laws similar is their language, which emphasizes the importance of
“socialist modernization”; a key objective of China’s national development. In addition to
protecting the rights of property owners, the legal language of these laws was specifically crafted
to align with China’s socialist ideals and economic developmental strategy30. However, this
created friction with international standards with respect to the enforcement and protection of IP.
The apex of tension between the US and China concerning Chinese IP laws transpired during
most of the 1990s. During this time, the US actively blocked China from entering the WTO until
China revised its IP laws and streamlined them with the TRIPS Agreement31.
Enforcement
China’s IP regime is highly bureaucratic and incorporates various enforcement bodies.
These include administrative enforcement via various agencies, criminal enforcement, civil
enforcement by courts, and border enforcement through custom officials. Moreover, IP
enforcement in China takes the form of both private and public enforcement. Private
enforcement is conducted by parties that take action via civil courts while the latter is conducted
via various government administrations32. The main difference between private enforcement and
public enforcement, according to Clarke, is that it is the “IPR owners, not government officials
who decide whether or not to bring the mechanism into play, and it is the parties to the
proceedings, not the state, that bear all the costs” associated with the case.33 The three main
subcategories of IP—trademarks, copyrights, and patents—are the main focus here. Each
subcategory is operated by different state-owned administrations that possess specific powers,
responsibilities, and purposes. There are also visible strengths and weaknesses within these
various administrations.
Trademark protection is enforced by the Association of Industry and Commerce (AIC).
The AIC is set up at the provincial level, city level, and district level across the country. It has
ex-offico power34. Some of the official powers and responsibilities of the AIC include
interviewing the parties concerned in the dispute, which includes the alleged violator and the
trademark owner; reviewing parties’ material relating to the violations such as contracts,
materials, invoices; executing raids and investigations of alleged locations where trademark
violations take place; and checking articles relating to the infringement35.The AIC cooperates
with other administrative agencies like customs, provincial, and national agencies. Provincial
conflicts and political motivations affect whether or not an AIC office takes a case or not. Court

29

Ibid.
Ibid.
31
Ibid.
32
Kristie Thomas, The Fight Against Piracy: Working within the Administrative Enforcement System in China,
Editor. Torremans, Paul; Shawn, Hailing; Erauw, Johan (UK: Edward Elgar) 86
30

33

Clarke, Donald. "Private Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in China." National Bureau of Asian
Research. : 33-34.
34
This is the right of an administration to initiate enforcement actions whenever deemed necessary. It does not
have to wait until a complaint is received (Ellis: 33).
35
Kristie Thomas, The Fight Against Piracy: Working within the Administrative Enforcement System in China,
Editor. Torremans, Paul; Shawn, Hailing; Erauw, Johan (UK: Edward Elgar) 92
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awards for damages in trademark cases are no greater than Renminbi (RMB) 1million. Damage
awards should include the profits that the infringer made, and legal and court expenses36.
The appropriate authority for copyright protection is the National Copyright Administration
(NCA). This body is also located at provincial and local levels and has the power to: intervene in
cases of infringement, order cessation of infringements, impose fines and confiscate products,
initiate ex-offico power. The weakness of the NCA is its low quality service in the less
developed areas of China, such as in the Western provinces. In these areas, authorities lack
adequate and experienced staff. Moreover, fines cannot exceed RMB 100,000 (USD $16,670).37
The State Intellectual Property for Patent Enforcement (SIPO) is responsible for patent
administration and enforcement. Unlike the AIC and the NCA, the SIPO does not hold ex-offico
power to regulate infringement cases38. Thus, enforcement must be activated by the patentee or
interested party. Also, in order to initiate a patent, a written request must be made for
investigation by the holder. The infringer will be notified about the patentee’s request for action
which eliminates any type of hope of catching the perpetrator by surprise. These reasons make
patent enforcement a less attractive and effective option for IPR holders.
From the 1970s up to when China became a member of the WTO in 2001, the state’s
intellectual property laws went through a process of continuous revision and transformation. The
crafting of laws to fall in sync with the country’s national development goals was intercepted by
exogenous pressure that sought to align them with international standards. This case not only
illustrates the transplant effect on Chinese IP law, it also displays the strength of compellence as
a form of coercion that led China to amend many of its IP laws. If China wanted to enter the
WTO, it had to align the inconsistencies of its laws to fit within those of the TRIPS Agreement.
Given the limitations of foreign pressure in enforcing IPR beyond the central government, the
state confirmed that it would ensure that the governments at the provincial and local levels would
observe the obligations under the WTO’s agreement39. China’s commitment to comply with the
TRIPS Agreement led to legislative reforms in the Patent Law, Copyright Law, and Trademark
Law40. Article 41 of the TRIPS Agreement stipulates that all:
Members shall ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in this Part are
available under their law so as to permit effective action against any act of
infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this Agreement,
including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and remedies which
36

Devonshire-Ellis, Chris; Scott, Andy; Woollard, Sam. Intellectual Property Rights in China. Dordrecht: Springer,
2011. http://fairfield.eblib.com.libdb.fairfield.edu/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=993785 (accessed September 25,
2013): 33

37

Ibid.
Ibid.
39
Wang, Guiguo. Radiating Impact of WTO on Its Members’ Legal System: The Chinese Perspective. Leiden:
BRILL,2011.http://fairfield.eblib.com.libdb.fairfield.edu/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=1112700 (accessed September
24, 2013): 158
38

40

Kristie Thomas, The Fight Against Piracy: Working within the Administrative Enforcement System in China,
Editor. Torremans, Paul; Shawn, Hailing; Erauw, Johan (UK: Edward Elgar) 100
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constitute a deterrent to further infringements. These procedures shall be
applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade
and to provide for safeguards against their abuse.41
China’s patent law underwent two stages of revision and amendment since its induction
on April, 1985. It was drafted on the principles of the Paris Convention—such as the right of
priority and independence of patents—while being crafted to be made “compatible with the
Chinese situation”. China’s patent law was first amended during the process of China regaining
membership at the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The scope of protection by
the amended patent law extended to the protection of goods such as food, drinks, and spices. It
extended the duration of protection to 20 years for invention patents and 10 years for utility
models and industrial designs42. The law was amended once more in August of 2000 to address
the inconsistencies of the 1992 patent law and the TRIPs. A key provision added to the amended
patent law is the opportunity for requesting judicial review of final administrative decisions.
Article 41 (4) stipulates:
Parties to a proceeding shall have an opportunity for review by a judicial
authority of final administrative decisions and, subject to jurisdictional
provisions in a Member's law concerning the importance of a case, of at least
the legal aspects of initial judicial decisions on the merits of a case.43

Judicial review is done by the People’s Court of China, a separate body from the
administrative agencies. This law helps to mitigate the corruption and local protectionism that
often transpires within the administrative system. Previously, rights holders could not appeal
administrative decisions to the people’s court. This acts as a system of check and balances,
ensuring that the decisions local officials make are not arbitrary or unscrupulous.
Trademark law also underwent similar amendments since it entered into force in March
1983. Ten years later, it was amended to add provisions that extended protection of the rights
holder and the enforcement process. In 2001, it was amended to comply with the TRIPs as a
prerequisite for WTO accession44. Similar to patent law, there were many different amendments
to the old law (many technical in detail), including the right to judicial review of administrative
decisions was implemented45. Copyright also had its own share of amendments in order to
comply with the TRIPs and gain China’s accession into the WTO. After it came into effect in
1990, the copyright law was revised in October of 2001 in accordance with the stipulations of the
TRIPs46.
China’s IP protection has been through a constant process of revision and amendment
that has implemented provisions and international standards transplanted from the WTO.
Compellence has been harnessed by the international community, primarily the US, to bring
41

World Trade Organization , "Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights." Last modified 04 15, 1994.
Accessed October 28, 2013. http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_01_e.htm.
42

Shoukang, Guo; Xaiodong, Zuo, Are Chinese Intellectual property laws consistent with the Trips Agreement?,
Editor. Torremans, Paul; Shawn, Hailing; Erauw, Johan (UK: Edward Elgar): p 12.
43
Ibid.
44
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China into the international IPR regime in order to become a member of the WTO and thus fully
legitimize its practice of international trade47. The country’s IP enforcement system has made
structural improvements due to China’s compliance with the TRIPs agreement. However, the
application of the law is often different from how it is written and this represents the limitations
of foreign pressure. Many enforcement problems remain within China’s IP regime. Foreign
pressure is largely limited to the central government and often fails to penetrate to the provincial
and local authorities that represent the enforcement mechanism for IP enforcement. The table
below illustrates the number of cases taken by administrative and judicial enforcement in 2004.
Table 2: Reported cases of IPR violations taken to administrative and judicial bodies48

Copyright

Trademark

Patent

Judicial

Judicial

Administration

administration

administration

enforcement

enforcement

enforcement

enforcement

enforcement

(criminal cases)

(civil cases)

9691

51,851

1455

385

8332

According to a 2004 study, trademark actions of enforcement are the most popular and
effective in China and account for “more than 80 percent of the administrative cases handled” in
2004. These cases are proposed to the AIC that then decides whether or not to pursue new cases.
Copyright infringement has the second highest number in 2004.The appropriate authority for this
category is the National Copyright Administration (NCA). Patent enforcement had the second
lowest number of reported cases in 200449.
Administrative enforcement is recognized as the most popular and effective type of
enforcement strategy used by rights holders because they find it to be more pragmatic and less
costly than private enforcement—through civil procedure in courts—which can take years to be
resolved. While it may take years for civil procedures to be settled, some estimates report that it
can take between two to three days for administrative agencies to take action while an entire case
may be solved and disposed of in two to three months50. Administrative enforcement is thus a
faster and more sought after option for IP rights owners who generally prefer more rapid forms
of action.
47

Cha-Yueh Liao, Jessica. "China's Response to the global IPR Regime: Compliance or Resistance?." Issues and
Studies. no. 04 (2006): 181. https://fairfield.illiad.oclc.org/illiad/illiad.dll?Action=10&Form=75&Value=32912
(accessed October 31, 2013): p 181

48

Jingzhou Tao, Problems and new developments in the enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in China,
Editor. Torremans, Paul; Shawn, Hailing; Erauw, Johan (UK: Edward Elgar): 88

49

Kristie Thomas, The Fight Against Piracy: Working within the Administrative Enforcement System in China,
Editor. Torremans, Paul; Shawn, Hailing; Erauw, Johan (UK: Edward Elgar): p 89-90

50

Kristie Thomas, The Fight Against Piracy: Working within the Administrative Enforcement System in China,
Editor. Torremans, Paul; Shawn, Hailing; Erauw, Johan (UK: Edward Elgar): p 86,94
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The overwhelming disadvantage of using administrative enforcement is handling the
bureaucratic corruption within these administrations. The party seeking administrative
enforcement will most likely have to deal with unofficial costs necessary to compel officials to
start a new case. For example, it is known that local authorities often expect luxuries such as
include pre-raid and post-raid meals provided by rights holders51.
The official costs of taking administrative enforcement are overwhelming and the AIC is
a suitable example of such a case. For example, a foreign trademark owner is expected to pay a
fee of USD $1,000-$5,000 per complaint. Some cases have cost as much as US $6,000
(RMB100 000), depending on the number of charges52. Since it is the responsibility of the rights
holder to collect all preliminary evidence of IP infringement before coming to the AIC, cost may
also include hiring private investigation and legal counsel53. Furthermore, the financial rewards
are miniscule given that court awards for damages in trademark cases are no greater than RMB
1million or US $167,000.54 Therefore, companies that have lost millions of US dollars in sales
due to IP violations receive only a fraction of the amount of profit lost to counterfeit goods.
Given these circumstances, administrative enforcement can be a costly, unattractive and
financially burdensome process.
Penalties in fines do not constitute any real “economic disincentive to intellectual
property infringement”55. There are two reasons explaining this: Chinese law does not set a
minimum limit on fines and officials have tremendous freedom of judgment when determining
the amount to be fined56. Issuing the maximum penalty and ordering criminal imprisonment are
rare.
Another problem impeding effective administrative enforcement in China is local
protectionism. This involves the securing of local economic interests of infringers by
administrative authorities to the disadvantage of trademark holders57. The language within the
TRIPS Agreement, Part III Article 1, explicitly forbids this practice when it states:
Procedures concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights shall be
fair and equitable. They shall not be unnecessarily complicated or costly, or
entail unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted delays.58
Local protectionism is a form of state supported safeguard that looks out for IPR
infringers. The parties involved in this relationship are local authorities and those involved in
infringement. Local protectionism is sustained through bribes, ties to local authority, and the
prioritizing of local interests over national laws by local officials. The last point is critical to
51
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p 93
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2013): 33
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Editor. Torremans, Paul; Shawn, Hailing; Erauw, Johan (UK: Edward Elgar): p 110
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Editor. Torremans, Paul; Shawn, Hailing; Erauw, Johan (UK: Edward Elgar): p 11
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Editor. Torremans, Paul; Shawn, Hailing; Erauw, Johan (UK: Edward Elgar): p 95
58
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many local authorities who see IP enforcement as a threat to the growth of their local
economies.59 This is especially true for provinces in which counterfeit trade is prevalent to the
point where the local economy greatly depends on it for continued growth. Local protectionism
disrupts the enforcement process, giving agencies flexibility to pick some cases and ignore the
ones to which they are illegally protecting.60 It also determines whether or not officials respond
to a particular case given the mix of interests involved. In some cases officials are known to have
provided infringers with insider information in advance, giving them ample time to relocate or
dispose of their counterfeit goods61. It also involves local officials who confiscate goods and
later return them to the infringers.62 Challenges like these illustrate the limitations of foreign
pressure on IPR on local and provincial levels in China.
The bureaucratic redundancy caused by the overlapping of administrative jurisdiction
poses another weakness of administrative enforcement. Redundancy within the policy
enforcement markets often includes trademarks and copyrights. In some instances the
overlapping between 2 bureaucracies over a single jurisdiction may occur.63 For example, the
AIC and the departments responsible for product quality (TSBs) are both responsible for cases in
which trademark infringement and counterfeiting cases exist.64 This overlapping between
different administrative bodies has resulted in “poor coordination and poor cooperation among
the various governmental agencies”.65
Level of Public Awareness
The challenges presented above represent two major points: the weakness and limitations
of exogenous pressure in penetrating its influence onto the local and provincial levels and the
paradoxical nature of the central government which is authoritative but at the same time unable
to ensure that IPR are properly enforced on the administrative level. The administrative
drawbacks of IP enforcement in China act as an impediment to the overall goals of the TRIPS
agreement. However, this cannot be determined to be the only contributor to IP infringement. A
low level of public awareness of IP also represents a complex and widespread impediment to
effective and sustainable IP enforcement, given that the country’s culture is rooted in certain
traditional beliefs. The concept of IP rights remains “culturally unfamiliar” to many Chinese
59

Jingzhou Tao, Problems and new developments in the enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in China,
Editor. Torremans, Paul; Shawn, Hailing; Erauw, Johan (UK: Edward Elgar): 109
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Kristie Thomas, The Fight Against Piracy: Working within the Administrative Enforcement System in China,
Editor. Torremans, Paul; Shawn, Hailing; Erauw, Johan (UK: Edward Elgar): 97
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Editor. Torremans, Paul; Shawn, Hailing; Erauw, Johan (UK: Edward Elgar): 109
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Kristie Thomas, The Fight Against Piracy: Working within the Administrative Enforcement System in China,
Editor. Torremans, Paul; Shawn, Hailing; Erauw, Johan (UK: Edward Elgar): 95
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Mertha, Andrew. 2005. The Politics of Piracy : Intellectual Property in Contemporary China. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press: 298
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Editor. Torremans, Paul; Shawn, Hailing; Erauw, Johan (UK: Edward Elgar): 108
65
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people who struggle to see the moral wrong in counterfeit trade and IP violations. 66 While the
traditional western concept of IP fosters the exclusive rights of individual ownership, traditional
Chinese culture embraces community ownership.
Globalization has tremendously transformed China, forcing it to adapt to the modern
world and thus changing “its perception of self, culture and cultural identity”67. However, there
exist a fundamental disconnect between ancient Chinese culture and the idea of intellectual
property rights. Gisclair explains that China faces a “cultural and intellectual dissonance when it
comes to IPR”.68 China’s philosophical underpinning according to Confucian doctrine stipulates
that all forms of creativity belong to the “community”, not the individual.69 China’s current
relationship with IP suggests that this cultural disconnect still exists today at least to a certain
extent.
While western legal morality would repudiate any form of imitation or unauthorized
copying, the Chinese Confucian doctrine believes that these are acceptable practices that
honor—instead of disregard—the creator and illustrates acceptance in his/her artistic creation.70
These ideas thrived for centuries in China, especially during the Maoist era, until the Open Door
Policy era reshaped how IPR would be built into China’s modernization efforts. The extent to
which people in contemporary China embrace this tradition would be difficult to measure;
however, when examining the magnitude and popularity of piracy, the effects of this traditional
belief still permeate among the public. The public’s awareness of IPR will have to be
continuously uprooted in order to erase centuries of tradition and ethical beliefs.71
Liu would agree and also add that the “lay legal culture” of China is incompatible with
the western conception of IPR. Therefore, Chinese customs, opinions, ways of doing and
thinking have not fully accustomed to a different conception of IPR.72 Furthermore, as a recipient
of transplanted laws, China possesses some of the disparities that illustrate the degree to which
transplanted laws produced friction with domestic enforcement and the general attitude of the
Chinese public towards IPR.
Foreign Companies Sourcing in China
Issues with administrative enforcement and the level of public awareness are two
significant problems that limit the level of success that China’s IP regime acquires. Not only do
they illustrate the paradox of China’s authoritative bureaucracy, they also represent the
limitations of exogenous pressure in securing their IP interests in China. These, however, are not
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the only contributing factors to the perpetuation of IP violations given the countless mistakes
made by foreign companies that are not familiar with sourcing their products in China.
China has a large resource endowment of labor that can be efficiently mobilized for the
manufacturing process. The fact that China is the most populous country in the world with cheap
labor standards makes it an economic magnet for foreign companies looking to source their
product. In fact, it makes economic sense that any company would want to minimize expenditure
while at the same time maximizing profit. In spite of this, many companies have jumped into the
trap of attractive sourcing costs without considering the nature of China’s IP and economic
environment.
There exists in China a large market of counterfeit trade on which many local economies
thrive. China is identified as the biggest source and exporter of counterfeit products. China is
responsible for 79% of all cases of IPR violations worldwide, China is the leading exporter of
counterfeit goods when compared to more than 10 other countries; and goods coming from
China are most often seized by US borer protection services.73
A critical factor that contributes to the ongoing problem of IP violations in China is the
ignorance of foreign companies that manufacture products in China. There are many companies
that suffer from losses in sales of their goods. One of the causes of this may be attributed to
process of sourcing within China and the risk of losing products from the supply chain.
Most companies sourcing their products in China are unaware of the conditions and
locations where their products are being manufactured. China is viewed as a “sourcing center
rather than a business opportunity” meaning that companies did not take the necessary
precautionary measures to protect their IP.74 As a result, a number of unforeseeable infringes,
contract agreements violations, and challenges emerge such as the selling of unauthorized
products out the backdoor of factories. A major cause of this is factories that seek supplementary
income by selling excess products outside the authorized supply chain. These include waste
products, sub-quality products and overruns in production.75 Managers or even employees
sometimes steal these parts and later circulate them into the local market by selling them to
merchants for a fee in exchange. Whenever companies hire factories to manufacture their
product, some factories surreptitiously sub-contract the production of these products to low-scale
and unreliable factories that often ignore IPR.76 Factories are also guilty of outsourcing
supplementary materials to 3rd parties without confidentiality agreements or IP assignment
agreements77.
Comparing China Globally
This year (2013) the US and China have executed a joint operation at their respective
borders to crack down on counterfeit goods. Over 243,000 fake electronics were seized at both
the US and Chinese borders which includes brands such as apple, Dr. Dre Beets, Blackberry and
73

Chaudhry, Peggy E.; Zimmerman, Alan. The Economics of Counterfeit Trade. Dordrecht : Springer, 2009.
http://fairfield.eblib.com.libdb.fairfield.edu/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=429001: p 27-8

74

Ordish, Rebecca and Alan Adcock. 2008. China Intellectual Property - Challenges & Solutions : An Essential
Business Guide. Singapore: John Wiley & Sons (Asia): p 71

75

Ibid.
Ibid.
77
A confidentiality agreement is a contract that sets out the expectations and obligations of the parties involved in
business (Ordish: 71).
76

https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/jogc/vol2/iss1/3

14

Francis: Building China’s Intellectual Property Regime

Samsung smart phones. The operation took place at North American ports located in Los
Angeles, Cincinnati, Newark, and Anchorage and the Chinese cities of Beijing, Shanghai,
Shenzhen, and Guangzhou (Reuters: U.S. China Team up to Seize Counterfeit Goods in Joint
Operation). The statistical data below illustrate that China suffers from an unparalleled level of
counterfeit trade when compared to other leading nations.
Chart 1: Illustrating seizures by top sources of IP infringement (Chaudry: 30)

Seizures by country of origin. Source: US Customs and Border Protection, L.A. Strategic Trade Center

Chart 1 illustrates that China accounted for 80% of seizures counterfeit goods acquired
by the US customs and border protection in 2004. Counterfeit goods coming out of Taiwan,
Hong Kong, Pakistan and South Korea have significantly lower rates of seizure at North
American borders than goods leaving China. China’s accession into the WTO in 2001 did not
decrease the rate of confiscation. This is a discouraging figure given the increase in counterfeit
seizures since China’s compliance with the TRIPs and subsequent accession to the WTO. Table
3 below illustrates North America’s top trading partners for IPR Seizures in 2006. China tops the
list of countries, responsible for 81 percent of all seizures with a US domestic value of $125
million. Not even the values of counterfeit good leaving all of these countries combined could
surpass China’s counterfeit domestic value.
Table 3: Top Trading Partners for IPR seizures, 2006

78
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Table 4 illustrates the origins of counterfeit goods seized by the European Union (EU). Once
again, China ranks first, having the highest percentage of counterfeit goods flooding the
European Market.

Table 4: Origin of counterfeit goods seized in EU79

IPR infringement costs U.S. businesses US $320 billion every year, equivalent to annual value of
US exports to Asia (Reutuers). This is a significantly high cost, especially since the entire global
community is not taken into account. These figures illustrate that China is a global source and
leader of counterfeit trade, even after its accession into the WTO.
Conclusion
China’s modern IP regime has been through a process of transformation and
evolvement ever since the induction of the political and economic reforms of 1978. There was
79
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the desire to shift away from the previous regime and propel the country into a modernized era in
which China evolved into a more integrated and powerful nation. The creation of its first set of
IP laws introduced the Western conception of exclusivity and individual ownership which is
fundamentally different from its previous laws that were rooted in state possession. However,
these laws lacked key provisions that were seen as necessary by the international community for
China to improve and strengthen its IP regime. After amending its laws and subsequently
accessing the WTO, IP violations continued to increase in China. Administrative corruption can
cripple the mobilization of enforcement and prevent rights owners from identifying infringers
and receiving compensation for their losses. Chinese lay legal culture remains inclined towards
engaging in IP infringement, whether or not those who engaged in this activity are entrepreneurs
or customers. Moreover, inexperienced foreign companies worsen the situation by overlooking
critical factors when sourcing their goods in China. Today, China still remains the country from
which more than three-fourths of counterfeit goods are imported and seized by US customs and
Border Services.
Examining IP in China has shed light on two key points: firstly, foreign pressure is weak
and limited in penetrating the central government in advancing its IPR interests. Local and
provincial authorities have tremendous amount of power to enforce and control how different
administrative agencies handle cases. Secondly, IP in China represents a paradoxical quality of
the central government, which is authoritative but simultaneously unable to ensure that IPR are
properly enforced by those on the local level. As a result, IP enforcement in China remains weak.
China’s weak enforcement system can negatively affect its popularity and attractiveness to
overseas businesses and companies given that many of them lose billions of dollars a year to the
sale of counterfeit goods. This indirectly impacts the aggregate success of international business
and trade as two phenomenons that play an integral role in our global economy. As responsible
global citizens, it is imperative to remain cognizant of the economic impacts of counterfeit trade
and to recognize the negative effects that it imposes on the global economy.
Appendix
Copyright Infringement: A Personal Account
During my five month study-abroad travel to Beijing, I witnessed countless copyright and
trademark infringements at electronic and apparel markets and photocopying stores. Beijing is
known as a magnet of economic interests for IPR infringement. Most of these businesses exist
within large establishments that are obviously too conspicuous not to be identified by the
government or local officials. These include the infamous Silk Street market, Quangzhao Daidao
sports specialist shops and Hongquiao Market80. Hongquiao Market otherwise known as the
Pearl Market is a well-known apparel and electronic market located in 9 Tiantan Rd, Dongcheng,
Beijing. A large portion of the counterfeit goods sold in this market are electronics such as CDs,
DVDs, headphones, cell phones and various apple products. The pictures below were collected
during the spring semester of 2013 and illustrate the types of goods that were purchased at
Hongquiao Market.
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Figure 1Trademark Infringement on Ray Band, Wayfarer Syle Sun Glasses.
Cost: RMB 30 (US $3.30)

The lowest price listed on Ray Ban’s website for a pair Wayfarer style sunglasses cost US$
$150.00. The pair of glasses in the picture above was sold at a significantly lower cost than the
official pair. The counterfeit Ray Band Glasses above would be appropriately categorized as an
infringement of Ray Ban’s trademark rights given that the company’s signature logo has been
used to identify the product. The quality and price both indicate that the product is not
authentic.81
Collection of Rosetta Stone Language CDs (Chinese Mandarin and Spanish) RMB 35, each
(US $5.80, each)
The market price for a collection of Rosetta Stone
Spanish (Level 1-5) set is currently US $499.00.82
The set purchased at Hongquiao market cost US
$5.80 for each language collection. The counterfeit
prices are tremendously attractive to foreigners and
Chinese people who shop at this market. This
collection of Rosetta Stone CDs may be
appropriately identified as a violation of Rosetta
Stone’s trademark rights and copyrights. The
company’s signature logo is used along with the
content in the CD.

Integrated Chinese, Text Book. Cost: RMB 20 (US $3.30)

81
82

The salesperson started the price at RMB 120 (US $20), which was later negotiated to RMB 40.
See: http://www.rosettastone.com/learn-spanish-spain
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Figure 2Trademark and Copyright Infringement
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The picture below illustrates another copyright infringement. The book was photocopied at a
small photocopying shop in Cahoyang, Beijing. Photocopying is affordable and widely popular
among foreign and Chinese students who prefer to purchase a photocopy instead of buying the
original copy which would cost US $57.99. 83
Many local businesses in China, like Hongquiao market, depend on counterfeit trade for
employment survival84. It helps explain why local protectionism is so prevalent in local
economies given that many local officials depend on these businesses to contribute to their local
economic growth.

Figure 3Textbook Copyright Infringement

83

84

See: http://www.cheng-tsui.com/store/products/integrated_chinese
Pang, Laikwan. 2012. Creativity and its Discontents : China's Creative Industries and Intellectual Property Rights
Offenses. Durham, NC: Duke University Press : p100
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